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Solving a Production and Inventory Model 
with a Minimum Lot Size Constrain 
Knut Richter and Irena Okhrin 
Abstract: The paper deals with the analysis of a special dynamic production and inventory 
model. In this model logical restrictions to fulfill an accepted constant minimal level of the 
production lot size are incorporated, instead of keeping setup cost in the objective function, as 
it is common in many other models. Detailed optimality conditions are derived, which make 
possible the application of a simple dynamic programming recursion procedure. 
Keywords: dynamic production-inventory model, minimum lot size, dynamic programming  
 
1.  Introduction 
In Richter and Gobsch (2005) a class of dynamic models of closed-loop logistics has been 
proposed in which the demand is satisfied by originally produced products as well as by re-
manufactured used products. Apart from many other approaches (Minner and Lindner 2003, 
Richter and Sombrutzki 2000, Richter and Weber 2001, Golany, Yang, and Yu 2001, Beltrán 
and Krass 2002, etc.) the lot size is not determined by finding the minimum of the setup cost 
and holding cost but by minimizing the inventory cost subject to certain lot size restrictions. 
The special case of constant minimal lot size values and restricted return rates of an efficient 
dynamic  programming  algorithm  has  been  presented  which  employs  efficiently  solvable 
combinatorial sub-problems. Since the main attention was paid to the problems of the closed-
loop logistics, the algorithm was described rather shortly. In fact, the model described in that 
paper demands a two-dimensional dynamic programming procedure. Special assumptions on 
the backflow of used products, however, allow the reduction to a one-dimensional procedure. 
If the backflow is cut the dynamic problem with lot size restrictions to be studied here ap-
pears.  
 
2. The basic problem with lot size restrictions 
The process of producing a product for several periods of a planning horizon is considered. 
The items are produced during the periods according to the demand which occurs at the end 
of the periods. By accumulation of produced items stocks will be created and inventory cost 
appears (see Fig. 1).    2 
Fig.1. The basic problem 
 
The following symbols will be used below. The sets of integers, natural numbers and real 
numbers are denoted by  I ,  { } ,... 2 , 1 N =  and  R , correspondingly. Furthermore, the following 
characters denote: 
N T Î  – planning horizon consisting of T periods,  
I Dt Î  – demand for the product in the t
th period, where  ∑ = - =
t
i j j t i D D , 1 ,  0 D j , j = ,  
R H Î  – the per unit inventory cost for the product,   
N mÎ  – the minimal bound (level) of the positive lot size for the production process.  
The variables are denoted by  
t I  – inventory of final products at the end of the t
th period,  ∑ = - =
t
i j j t i I I , 1 and  
t z  – production rate of the t
th period  ∑ = - =
t
i j j t i z z , 1 . 
Now the following model will be presented: 
The inventory at the beginning and at the end of the planning horizon is set equal zero, e. g.  
0 I I T 0 = = .                       (1) 
The inventory of a new period equals the previous inventory plus the difference of production 
and demand:  
. T ,..., 2 , 1 , t 0 I , D z I I t t t 1 t t = ³ - + = -                 (2) 
Due to the given minimal lot size bound the real lot sizes have to be either equal zero or not to 
be smaller than m . This condition is expressed by   
{ } [ [ T t m zt ,..., 2 , 1     , , 0 = +¥ È Î .                (3) 
Lot size restrictions of the similar structure were also considered in Beer, Käschel, and Rich-
ter (1979) as well as in Richter, Bachmann and Dempe (1988).  Recent papers that consider 
minimum lot size constrains are, among others, Kallrath (1999), Suerie (2005) and Souza, 




stock  Demand   3 
The goal of minimizing the inventory cost is modeled by the objective function:  
  min I H
T
1 t
t ® ∑ ×
=
.                    (4) 
Note that the condition (3) forbids the constellation  m zt < < 0 , i.e. no lot sizes below the 
minimal level are allowed. In the objective function (4) the end of period inventories are mul-
tiplied by the cost factors and the whole expression is to be minimized. Since that cost factor 
is not significant for the study, it will be omitted, and the minimization of the total inventory 
will remain as the main goal. 
The entire model (1) – (4) has then the following compact form (5).  
{ } [ [
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, ,..., 2 , 1    , 0    , =
  , , 0










-               (5) 
Example 1: Given the demand  ( ) 4 , 4 , 4 , 4 D = ,  7 m = . The solution No. 1 with two produc-
tion periods shown in Fig. 2 is obviously feasible. The total inventory of this solution is 
10 4 1 5 = + + . This solution can be also presented graphically as in Fig. 3. The demand is 
shown by bold lines at the end of the periods, the productions quantities are represented by the 
marked areas and the inventories by grey areas.  
Better feasible solutions with the cost of  e 2 10-  units are given by the solutions No. 2(e):  
0 I z z , 4 I , 1 I , 5 I , 7 z , 9 z 4 4 2 3 2 1 2 1 = = = = - = - = + = - = e e e e  for  1 0 £ £ e  .  
Fig. 2. The material flow for the solution No. 1 of example 1 
 
 
The model (5) is obviously a linear program on a union of convex polyhedral sets. Hence an 
optimal solution can be found among the basis (extreme) solutions. The approach presented 
now will concentrate on the properties of basis solutions.  
z1=9 
D1=4 
t=1  2  3  4 
4  4  4 
I1=5  I2=1 
z3=7 
I3=4   4 
Fig. 3. The solution No. 1 of example 1 
1  2  3  4 
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
 
 
3. The Dynamic Programming Approach  
3.1. Sub-problems with restricted lot sizes 
The  problem  (5)  will  be  denoted  by  ) T , 0 ( SP and  any  sub-problem  for  selected  periods 
t ,..., 1 i , i j + =  with  1 t ,..., i j , 0 I , 0 I I j t 1 i - = ³ = = -      by  ) t , 1 i ( SP - . It will be also said that a 
sub-problem is generated by the pair  ( ) t , i . The corresponding minimum cost for an optimal 
basis  solution  of  a  solvable  sub-problem  will  be  denoted  by  t , 1 i C - .  The  sub-problem 
) t , 1 i ( SP -  is called solvable (unsolvable) if  m D t , 1 i ³ -  ( ) m D t , 1 i < -        (6)  
holds. A sub-problem  ) t , 1 i ( SP -  is called minimal, if there is no period  t k i < <  such that 
t , k k , 1 i t , 1 i C C C + = - - .                    (7)   
It follows from the definition of the minimal sub-problem that the inventory values of an op-
timal solution are positive except for the last period. 
An optimal basis solution of the problem (5) consists on a composition of optimal basis solu-
tions for appropriate minimal sub-problems  
) , ( ),..., , (   ), , 0 ( 1 2 1 1 L L t t SP t t SP t SP - ,  T L £ £ 1 .             (8) 
The  feasible  basis  solutions  with  positive  inventories  for  the  first  example  are  given  by 
) 0 , 0 , 0 , 16 ( z1
4 , 0 = ,  ) 0 , 4 , 8 , 12 ( I1
4 , 0 =  and  ) 0 , 0 , 9 , 7 ( z2
4 , 0 = ,  ) 0 , 4 , 8 , 3 ( I2
4 , 0 =  with the total in-
ventory values 24 and 15, correspondingly. This example regarded as a sub-problem is not 
minimal, since the minimum is reached by  8 C C 4 , 2 2 , 0 = + .  
Transformations: In the argumentation used below three types of transformation are applied 
all of which produce a new feasible solution with reduced total inventory.  
) j , j ( 1 T ¢ ¢ ¢ :  In  this  case  there  are  given  two  production  periods  j j ¢ ¢ < ¢    5 
with 1 ,..., , 0    , - ¢ ¢ ¢ = > ³ > ¢ ¢ ¢ j j j I m z z j j j . Then the transformation 
1 ,..., , :   , : , : - ¢ ¢ ¢ = - = + = - = ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ j j j I I z z z z j j j j j j e e e  for  { } 1 j j I , m z min - ¢ ¢ ¢ - = e      (9)    
will be applied.  
) j ( 2 T :  There  is  a  production  period  i j >   with  j 1 j D I ³ - .  Then  the  transformation 
0 z , z I : I z z : z j j j j j 1 j 1 j = - = + = + +     ,    will be applied.          (10) 
) j ( 3 T : There is a production period  t j <  with  m 2 z j ³  or  m z j =  and  m I j ³ . Then the 
transformation  m z : z , m I :  I , m z : z 1 j 1 j j j j j + = - = - = + +    will be applied.     (11) 
The transformations are illustrated by the examples 2 in Tab. 1.   
Tab. 1.   Examples 2 to illustrate the transformations T1 – T3 
j  1  2  3  4  5  6 
Dj  4  4  4  4  4  4 
Total 
inventory 
zj  7  10  0  0  7  0  T1(2, 5) 
Ij  3  9  5  1  4  0  22 
zj  7  9  0  0  8  0  ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ 
Ij  3  8  4  0  4  0  19 
zj  7  10  0  7  0  0  T2(4) 
Ij  3  9  5  8  4  0  29 
zj  7  10  0  0  7  0  ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ 
Ij  3  9  5  1  4  0  22 
zj  7  17  0  0  0  0  T3(2) 
Ij  3  16  12  8  4  0  43 
zj  7  10  7  0  0  0  ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ 
Ij  3  9  12  8  4  0  36 
 
Lemma 1: Let an optimal basis solution of a minimal sub-problem  ) t , 1 i ( SP -  be given. 
(i) Then there is no more than one period  j¢ such that  m z j > ¢ , i. e.  { } j j m z j ¢ ¹ Î    , , 0 . (12) 
(ii) Such a period is the last production period for an optimal solution. 
Proof: (i) Let an optimal basis solution be given with  j j ¢ ¢ < ¢  and  
1 j ,..., j j , 0 I , m z , z j j j - ¢ ¢ ¢ = > > ¢ ¢ ¢    . Then the transformation  ) j , j ( 1 T ¢ ¢ ¢  can be applied which 
shows that the initial solution is not optimal or the sub-problem is not minimal. 
(ii) In the case when  m z j > ¢  and there is a production period  j¢ ¢  after  j¢, the application of 
) j , j ( 1 T ¢ ¢ ¢  would reveal that the solution is not optimal.   
If an optimal basis solution contains a period  j¢ with  m z j > ¢ , or if  j¢ is the last production 
period with  m z j = ¢ , the periods j j ¢ <  for which  m 0 z j Ú =  hold will be called extreme pro-  6 
duction periods. The periods  j j ¢ > , for which the values are equal zero i. e.,  0 z j = , are 
called zero production periods.  
 
3.1.1. Real sub-problems 
A  sub-problem  will  be  called  real  if  from  the  existence  of  a  period 
{ } N l , 1 i j l   , m l D : i j min j j , 1 i Î + - £ × = ³ = -
*  it follows that  m D
t j <
,
* .      (13)  
If there is no such period then the problem is always real. 
That  means,  provided  a  period * j   exists,  then  for  a  real  sub-problem  m ) 1 l ( D t , 1 i × + < -  
holds: 
 
Lemma 2: If a sub-problem  ) t , 1 i ( SP -  is minimal then it is real. 
Proof: Let an optimal basis solution of a minimal sub-problem be given which is not real, i.e. 
there is a period  * j  and  m D t *, j ³  holds. Let two cases be studied.   
(i) If  * j ,..., 1 i , i j , m 0 z j + = Ú =    then either  0 I * j =  holds or  m I * j ³ . In the first case the 
sub-problem  is  not  minimal,  i.e.  t *, j * j , 1 i t , 1 i C C C + = - - .  In  the  second  case,  due  to 
m D t *, j ³ , the transformation  ) j ( 3 T  can be applied to the last production period  * £ ¢ j j  and 
hence the initial solution is not optimal. 
(ii) There is a production period * j j £ +  with m z j > + . Then according to Lemma 1 this is 
the last production period. Hence  m 0 z j Ú =  holds for + < j j .  Then due to the assumption of 
the proof the relation m D I t , j j ³ = + +  holds. Now two cases can be distinguished: 
(
￿) If  m 2 z j > +  then the transformation  ) j ( 3 T  can be applied for + = j j .  
(b) Let m 2 z j < + . Then due to the definition of a real sub-problem (13) there is an integer 
0 > l  such that  * , 1 j i D m l - = × . It will be proved now that the number of production periods 
with  m z j =   before + j   is  not  less  than  the  number  l.  If  this  is  not  true  then 
t i j i j j i D m D m m l z z , 1 * , 1 1 , 2 ) 1 ( - - - £ + = + - < + + +  holds, i.e. the whole demand will not be satis-  7 
fied.  Then  * , 1 1 , j i j i D m l z - - = × ³ +   and  + + + + + ³ ³ - = - - - - - - j * j , 1 j 1 j , 1 i 1 j , 1 i 1 j D D D z I hold. 
That means that the transformation  ) j ( 2 T  can be applied for  + = j j .   
Corollary: A real sub-problem is not necessarily minimal! Example 1 is real but not minimal. 
 
3.1.2. Critical period 
Below only minimal sub-problems will be analyzed. First, the following parameters and re-
markable periods are introduced: 
Let’s introduce the integers  1    , ,
, 1













k .           (14) 
Provided, the relations  ( ) 1 i l m D l , 1 i + - × < - ,  * < + = j j , j ,... 1 i , i l   ,       (15) 
hold, the number  1 k j , 1 i + -  is the minimal number of production periods of size m  satisfying 
this demand. Since only one production figure can be larger than m , the number  t , 1 i k -  shows 
how many productions periods are needed to satisfy the whole demand of the sub-problem. 
Let the period { } m ) 1 i j ( D : i j min j j , 1 i
# × + - > ³ = -            (16) 
be the first period where the relation (15) is strongly violated.  
If the relations (15) hold, the critical period  { } m ) 1 k ( D : i j min j t , 1 i j , 1 i t , 1 i × - > ³ = - - -    (17) 
is such a period the demand of which cannot be satisfied fully by  1 k t , 1 i - -  production periods 
of size  m . Therefore it is the last production period with a production figure equal or larger 
than m . Alternatively, the definition  { } 1 k k : i j min j t , 1 i j , 1 i t , 1 i - = ³ = - - -       (18) 
can be used.  
Another period which is important for the analysis is 
{ } 1 k k : i j min j 1 j , 1 i j , 1 i > - ³ = - - -
´ .               (19) 
If the periods ´ * j j , j # or     do not exist they will be set equal  1 t + , correspondingly. 
 
Lemma 3: Let a real sub-problem  ) t , 1 i ( SP -  be given. 
(i) Then  * j j t , 1 i £ -   and 
(ii) if a period  # j  exists then  m D # j >  and  * j j# £  holds and it coincides with  ´ j .  (20)   8 
Proof: (i) Let  * j j t , 1 i > - . Then due to the definition (17) the relation  ( ) m 1 k D t , 1 i * j , 1 i × - £ - -  
and the inequality  t , 1 i t , 1 i * j , 1 i D m k m D - - - £ × £ +  hold. It follows from the last inequality that 
m D t *, j ³ , what contradicts the assumption. 
(ii)  Let  now  a  period  i j# >   exist.  Then  due  to  the  definition  (16)  the  relation 
m m ) i j ( m ) 1 i j ( D D D # #
1 j , 1 i j , 1 i j
# # # = - - + - > - = - - -  holds and the demand  # j D  is lar-
ger  than  m .  If  there  is  a  period  * j ,  then  the  relation  ) j ( m t * £   holds.  Then  the  case 
* j j# >  is not possible due to  m D # j > , i.e.  * j j# £  holds. It follows from this property and 
from the definition (16) that  m ) i j ( D #
1 j , 1 i
# × - < - -  and  1 i j
m
D










 - - . Based on 
this inequality the following estimation can be given: 





k k # # 1 j , 1 i j , 1 i
1 j , 1 i j , 1 i
# #




















- - - ,  by  which  the 
equality  ´ = j j#  is proved.  If  i j# =  then the statement holds per definition.  
Corollary: Since due to Lemma 2 minimal sub-problems are real Lemma 3 holds for such 
problems, too. 
Tab. 2: Example 3 of a real (minimal) sub-problem with  7 m = ,  4 k 6 , 0 = ,  4 j j# = = ´ , since 
4 , 0 3 , 0 D 29 7 4 18 D = < × < =  and  4 3 k 4 2 k = < =  
j  1  2  3  4  5  6 
Dj  6  6  6  11  2  2 
Total 
inventory 
k0,j  0  1  2  4       
zj  7  7  7  12  0  0   
Ij  1  2  3  4  2  0  12 
zj  7  11  0  15  0  0   
Ij  1  6  0  4  2  0  13 
 
 
Lemma 4: Let a sub-problem  ) t , 1 i ( SP -  be given with a period  # j . 
(i) If the sub-problem is real and  m D
t j <
,
#  then t , 1 i
# j j - =  and 
(ii) if it is minimal then  m D
t j <
,
#  and t , 1 i
# j j - = .  
Proof: If the sub-problem is real and a period  * j  exists, then it follows from Lemma 3 that   9 
* j j# £ .  Moreover,  m D t *, j <   and  m k D t , 1 i t , 1 i × ³ - -   hold.  Then 
( ) m 1 k D D D t , 1 i t *, j t , 1 i * j , 1 i × - > - = - - -  and  t , 1 i j * j - ³ . 
(i) Let  m D t , j
# < . Then  1 k
m
D D
k t , 1 i
t , j t , 1 i













-  holds.      (21) 
It will be proved that  t , 1 i
# j j - ¹  will lead to contradictions.  
First,  the  case  #
t , 1 i j j * j > ³ -   will  be  analyzed.  Then  due  to  the  definition  (17) 
m ) 1 k ( D t , 1 i j , 1 i
# - < - -   and  due  to  relation  (21)  the  contradicting  inequalities 
# # j , 1 i t , 1 i j , 1 i k 1 k k - - - £ - <  hold.  
Secondly, let the case  * j j j #
t , 1 i £ < -  be considered. Then due to the definition (16) the 
relation  ( ) m ) i j ( m 1 i j D #
t , 1 i j , 1 i t , 1 i - £ + - < - - -  holds. Due to this inequality and the defini-
tion  (18)  the  relation  i j 1 k k #
t , 1 i j , 1 i t , 1 i - < - = - - -   occurs.  Due  the  definition  (16)  also 
t , 1 i j , 1 i
# k k 1 i j # - - £ £ + -   holds  that  leads  to  the  contradiction  t , 1 i
#
t , 1 i k 1 i j k - - £ + - < . 
Hence the first statement is true, i.e.  t , 1 i
# j j - = .  
(ii) Because of Lemma 2 this case is fulfilled for  m D t , j
# <  automatically. For  m D
t j ³
,
#  it 
will be proved that the sub-problem is not minimal. Let an optimal basis solution be given. 
Since  1 i j# + -  production runs of size m  do not satisfy the demand  # j , 1 i D - , the production 
rate at the period  # j  will fulfill  m z # j > . Then due to Lemma 1 this is the last production 
period  at  all  and  m 2 m ) i j ( m m ) 1 i j ( z D D z # #
1 j , 1 i t , j j , 1 i j
# # # # = - - + + - > - + = - - - . 
Furthermore, the estimate  m D I t , j j
# # ³ =  holds and, the transformation  ) j ( 3 T  can be ap-
plied. Hence the case (ii) is not valid for minimal sub-problems.   
 
Lemma 5: Let a sub-problem  ) t , 1 i ( SP -  be given with a period  ´ j .  
(i) If the sub-problem is real and  m D t j < ´  then  m Dj > ´ , * j j £ ´  and  t , 1 i j j -
´ =  and, 
(ii) if it is minimal then  m D t j < ´ , m Dj > ´ , * j j £ ´  and  t , 1 i j j -
´ = .      (22)   10 
Proof: If a period  # j  exists, Lemmas 3 and 4 can be applied for both cases.  




k t , 1 i
t , j t , 1 i













´  holds.             (23) 
Further,  it  follows  from  2 k k 1 j , 1 i j , 1 i ³ - - - -
´ ´   that  m Dj > ´ .  Hence  as  in  the  proof  of 
Lemma 3 the inequality * j j > ´  is not possible. 
First, let  * j j j t , 1 i £ < ´
- . Then  1 k k j , 1 i j , 1 i t , 1 i - < ´
- - -  and  m ) 1 k ( D t , 1 i j , 1 i t , 1 i - £ - - -  hold. 
That is, however, a contradiction to the definition (17).  
Secondly,  let  * j j j t , 1 i £ < -
´ .  Then  ( )m 1 k D t , 1 i j , 1 i t , 1 i - > - - - ,  ( )m 1 k D t , 1 i j , 1 i - < - -
´   and 
1 k k t , 1 i j , 1 i - < - -
´ . That is a contradiction to formula (23). Hence the first statement con-
cerning  * j j j t , 1 i £ = -
´  is true. 
(ii) For the case of  m D t , j ³ ´ , it will be proved that in this case the sub-problem is not mini-
mal. Because of the assumption the sub-problem is real and the situation  * j j > ´  is not pos-
sible due to  m Dj > ´ . The equality  * j j = ´  is not possible either, because of the assumption 
on (ii). Hence  * j j < ´ . Note, that in this case  t , 1 i j , 1 i k k - - < ´  holds. Now let some optimal 
basis solution be given.  
First,  let  0 z t , 1 j = -
´ .  Then,  since  m Dj > ´   and  m D t , j ³ ´   there  is  some  closest  period 
# j j < ¢  with  m z j ³ ¢  and  m 2 D I t , 1 j j > ³ - ¢ ´ . If  m 2 z j ³ ¢  then the transformation  ) j ( 3 T  
can  be  applied.  Let  m 2 z j < ¢ .  Then  j 1 j j j 1 j j D m 2 I D z I I m 2 ¢ - ¢ ¢ ¢ - ¢ ¢ - + < - + = <   and, 
1 j j I D - ¢ ¢ <  and, the transformation  ) j ( 2 T  can be applied.  
Secondly, if 0 z , 0 z t , j j > = ´ ´     then there exists a closest period ´ < ¢ j j  with   m z j = ¢  and 
m I j > ¢ . Then again the transformation  ) j ( 3 T  can be applied.  
Thirdly, if  0 z , m z t , j j = ³ ´ ´     then either  m I , m 2 z j j ³ ³ ´ ´     or  m I , m 2 z j j ³ < ´ ´    . In the 
first case the transformation  ) j ( 3 T  can immediately be applied to the period  ´ j . For the sec-
ond  case,  it  can  be  noticed  that  the  inequalities  1 k k 2 k t , 1 i j , 1 i 1 j , 1 i - £ £ + - - - -
´ ´ ,   11 
3 k k t , 1 i 1 j , 1 i - £ - - -
´   and  ( ) m 2 k D t , 1 i 1 j , 1 i × - £ - - -
´   hold.  Furthermore  the  relations 
m k z z t , 1 i j 1 j , 1 i × ³ + - - -
´ ´  and  m 2 z j - > - ´  hold, i.e.  ( ) m 2 k z t , 1 i 1 j , 1 i × - > - - -
´  is fulfilled. 
Since  1 j , 1 i z - -
´  is a multiple of m , actually  ( ) m 1 k z t , 1 i 1 j , 1 i × - ³ - - -
´  holds. This means that 
m D z I 1 j , 1 i 1 j , 1 i 1 j ³ - = - - - - -
´ ´ ´  is true and the transformation  ) j ( 3 T  can be applied to 
the last positive production period before ´ j .   
 
Lemma 5 is illustrated by the example 4 in Tab. 3. The solution with  m D t , j ³ ´ ,  m 2 z j > ´  
and  m I j > ´  is transformed by  ) j ( 3 T  and, a better solution appears as a composition of solu-
tions for  ) , 1 (
´ - j i SP  and  ) , ( t j SP
´ . 
Tab. 3: Example 4 with  7 m = , 3 k 6 , 0 = , 4 j = ´  
j  1  2  3  4  5  6 
Dj  2  2  2  9  4  4 
Total 
inventory 
k0,j  0  0  0  2       
zj  7  0  0  16  0  0   
Ij  5  3  1  8  4  0  21 
zj  7  0  0  8  8  0  ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ 
Ij  5  3  1  0  4  0  13 
 
Corollary: It can be seen that if such period 
´ j  will be found then it will be always the last 
production period for a minimal sub-problem.  
 
3.1.3. Critical solution 
Now the following components of a basis solution for minimal sub-problems can be deter-
mined by means of the parameters (14) and (19): 
( ) j , 1 i j , 1 i j D m 1 k I - -
* - × + = ,  *
-




- - - - = 1 j t , 1 j j t , 1 i t , 1 i t , 1 i I D z ,  t , 1 i t , j j t , 1 i j j j , D I j j , 0 z -
*
-
* ³ = > =     , .     (25) 
The basis solution (24) – (25) will be called critical. The total inventory provided by the criti-
cal solution is denoted by  *
t , 1 i C - .  
 
Lemma 6: Let a sub-problem  ) t , 1 i ( SP -  for given period  i be regarded with  i t t =  and   12 
{ } ) j ( m ), j ( m ), j ( m min t #
i
´ * = ,                (26) 
where  { } m D : r max ) j ( m r , j < = . Then the problem is real and the critical solution is feasible. 
Proof: Because of the assumption (26) the sub-problem is real. Then Lemma 3 holds and 
* j j t , 1 i £ -   is  fulfilled  and,  due  to  the  definition  (13)  the  relation 
( ) m 1 k D m k j , 1 i j , 1 i j , 1 i × + < < × - - -  holds for  1 j ,..., 1 i , i j t , 1 i - + = - . It follows from these ine-
qualities  that  the  inventory  values  (24)  are  valid,  i.e.  the  strong  inequalities 
( ) 0 D m 1 k I j , 1 i j , 1 i j > - × + = - -
* , t , 1 i j j - <  hold. In case of the existence of a period  # j  the 
latter  is  equal  t , 1 i j -   and  * j j# £ .  That  means  that  ( ) m 1 i j D j , 1 i × + - < -   and 
1 i j 1 k j , 1 i + - £ + - , # j j < , i.e. the number of production periods is not greater than the num-
ber of periods. 
According to (24) the equality  ( ) m k k I D I z 1 j , 1 i j , 1 i 1 j j j j × - = - + = - - -
*
-
* *     (27) 
holds.  If  there  is  a  period  ´ j   then  due  to  Lemma  5  it  is  equal  t , 1 i j - and  therefore 
1 k k 1 j , 1 i j , 1 i £ - - - - , i.e. the production figures are equal zero or  m . Furthermore, it follows 
from the definitions (24) – (25) and the inequality   ( )
t , 1 i t , 1 i j , 1 i t , 1 i 1 j , 1 i D m 1 k D
- - - - - - < × - <  
that  1 k 1 k t , 1 i 1 j , 1 i t , 1 i - £ + - - - -  and that  = - = *
- -
*
- - - 1 j t , 1 j j t , 1 i t , 1 i t , 1 i I D z  
( ) ³ × + - + = - - - - - - - - m 1 k D D 1 j , 1 i 1 j , 1 i t , 1 j t , 1 i t , 1 i t , 1 i m m m k D t , 1 i t , 1 i ³ + × - - - , i.e. the produc-
tion figure at the critical period is feasible.  
Now it will be shown that the critical solution is also optimal. 
 
Theorem 1: Let a minimal sub-problem be given. Then the critical solution is optimal. 
Proof: (i) Due to Lemma 1 an optimal solution has a last production period whose production 
figure can be larger than  m . Therefore there is a period  t , 1 i J -  as the last production period 
and the periods before  t , 1 i J -  are extreme production periods and the periods after  t , 1 i J -  are 
zero production periods per definition. The inventories values for the periods after  t , 1 i J - are 
obviously given by  t ,..., J j , D I t , 1 i t , j j - = = . Now some more properties of optimal solutions 
will be proved.   13 
(ii)  It  will  be  shown  that  for  an  optimal  solution  the  relation  0 z j >   implies 
{ } j 1 j D ; m min I < - , or equivalently  { } j 1 j D ; m min I ³ -  implies  0 z j = . Let  j  be the first pe-
riod with  0 z j >  and  { } j 1 j D ; m min I ³ - .  
(iia) If  j D m £ , and  m I 1 j ³ -  then  i j > . Then there is a nearest production period  j j < ¢  for 
which due (i)  m z j = ¢  holds. Since the sub-problem is also real, due to Lemma 2, the inven-
tory value cannot be equal m  and, it is therefore strongly larger than  m , i.e.  m I 1 j > -  holds.                                                                   
Then the relation  m D I D I 1 j , j 1 j 1 j , j j + > + = - ¢ - - ¢ ¢  holds and the transformation  ) j ( 3 T  can 
be applied to the period  j¢. 
(iib) If  j D m > , 0 z j >  and  j 1 j D I ³ - , then the transformation  ) j ( 2 T can be applied. 
(iii) Now it will be shown that  { }
t , 1 i t , 1 i J J D m 3 ; m 2 max I
- - - < . Let  t , 1 i J j - =  and, on the oppo-
site,  { } j j D m 3 ; m 2 max I - = ³ D  and  m z j ³ .  
(iiia)  If  m Dj > ,  i.e.  m 2 = D   and  j j 1 j j D z I I m 2 - + = £ - ,  then  due  to  (ii) 
j j D z m m 2 - + <  holds and  j j z m D m 2 < + < . Then the transformation  ) j ( 3 T  can be ap-
plied to the period  t , 1 i J j - = . 
(iiib) If  m Dj £ , i.e.  j D m 3 - = D , then due to (ii)  j j j j D z m I D m 3 - + < £ -  holds and 
j z m 2 < . That means that the same transformation can be applied! 
(iv) Finally, it will be shown that  t , 1 i t , 1 i j J - - =  and that the inventory values for the extreme 
production periods are given by  * = j j I I , i.e. the optimal solution coincides with the critical 
solution. The critical solution is feasible due to Lemma 6.  
(iva) Let now  * < j j I I  be fulfilled for some period  t , 1 i J j - £ . Then, however, there is at least 
one production period less, i.e.,  0 D m k I j , 1 i j , 1 i j < - × £ - -  holds and the solution is not feasi-
ble.  
(ivb) If  * > j j I I   holds for a first production period  j , there is at least one production period 
more and  ( ) j , 1 i j , 1 i j D m 2 k I - - - × + ³  and  ( ) 1 j , 1 i 1 j , 1 i 1 j D m 1 k I - - - - - - × + = . Then  m I j ³  
and  m D t , j ³  holds. Due to Lemma 5(ii) then  * j j j £ < ´  holds.    14 
Then one of the two options is fulfilled: a)  1 j , 1 i j , 1 i k k - - - =   or, b)  1 k k 1 j , 1 i j , 1 i + = - - - .  
In the case a) per definition (14)  m k D 1 j , 1 i j , 1 i × < - - - ,  m Dj <  and,  
( ) m 2 D m 2 k I j , 1 i 1 j , 1 i j > - × + ³ - - -  holds. 
If a1)  t , 1 i J j - =  then this is a contradiction to the statement (iii).  
If a2)  t , 1 i J j - < then  m z j =  and  j j j j 1 j D D z I I > + - = -  which is a contradiction to (ii). 
In  the  case  b)  ( ) j 1 j j 1 j , 1 i 1 j , 1 i j j 1 j j D m 2 I D D m 3 k D z I I - + = - - × + ³ - + = - - - - - -  
holds, or  m 2 z j ³ . Then, however  t , 1 i J j - = . 
Hence  * = j j I I  holds for t , 1 i J j - £ . Then  t , 1 i t , 1 i j J - - =  since the critical solution cannot 
contain another production period.   
Remark: It follows from the previous statements that for a given period i the maximal length 
of a minimal sub-problem can be estimated by (26). Therefore the feasible pairs  ( ) t , i  which 
generate minimal sub-problems belong to the set 
( ) ( ) ( ) { } ) 0 ( m i 1 i , T t T ) t ( m , t t i : t , i X i > Ú = = Ú < £ < = .          (27) 
Due to the Lemma 6 sub-problems defined on elements from set  X  are real and the critical 
solution is feasible. 
 
3.2. Solution algorithm 
The approach presented here utilizes the ideas of dynamic programming and is illustrated by 
the example 5 in Tab. 4.  
Let  t F  be the minimal cost for the first t periods. Furthermore, let  0 F0 = . An optimal solu-
tion for the problem (5) can be found by the recursion 
( ) { } ) t ( i
*
t , 1 ) t ( i 1 i
*
t , 1 i
X t , i
t F C F C min F + = + = - - -
Î
.            (28)  
Detailed algorithm: 
end   end;     ;
    and     if   do
  until   For 
  do     until   For   
i : ) t ( i C F : F
C F F X ) t , (i
t 1 : i
; : F T 1 : t ; 0 : F
*
,t 1 i- 1 i
*





+¥ = = =
-
-
              (29)   15 
Lemma 7: The algorithm (29) generates an optimal solution as a series of optimal solutions 
of minimal sub-problems. 
Proof: First, it will be proved that the pairs ( ) t ), t ( i  generate minimal sub-problems. If this is 
not true then there are two first periods t and  1 i  such that *
t , 1 i
*
i , 1 ) t ( i
*
t , 1 ) t ( i 1 1 C C C - - - + ³ . (30) 
Due to the definition of  ) t ( i  the inequality  *
t , 1 i i
*
t , 1 ) t ( i ) t ( i 1 1 C F C F - - + < +  holds. Further-
more the relation  *
i , 1 ) t ( i ) t ( i i 1 1 C F F - + £  holds and 
*
t , 1 i
*
i , 1 ) i ( i ) i ( i
*
t , 1 ) t ( i ) t ( i 1 1 C C F C F - - - + + < + . This is a contradiction to inequality (30). 
Secondly, it will be proved that minimal total inventory for a problem over the first t periods 
is given by the value  t F . The sub-problem  ) 1 ) 0 ( m , 0 ( SP +  is obviously minimal and it has 
the critical solution  1 ) 0 ( m j 1 , 0 z , D z *
j 1 ) 0 ( m , 0
*
1 + £ < = = +     . 
Hence  0
*
1 ) 0 ( m , 0 1 ) 0 ( m F C F + = + +  express the minimal total inventory for  1 ) 0 ( m t + =  peri-
ods. Let now t be any period and the statement true for any period smaller than t. If  t F  is not 
equal  the  minimal  total  inventory  then  there  is  some  period  t k <   such  that 
*
t , 1 ) t ( i ) t ( i t , 1 k k C F C F - - + < + .                 (31) 
Then, however  *
t , 1 i i , 1 k t , 1 k 1 1 C C C - - - + =  and 
1 1 i i , 1 k k F C F = + -  holds. The latter relation 
leads to a contradiction to the assumption (31).  
 
4. Conclusions 
A special dynamic production and inventory model has been studied in this paper. Apart from 
the mainstream of lot-size modeling here logical restrictions to keep the lot size on an ac-
cepted minimal level will contribute to set up an efficient production plan. The detailed analy-
sis of the model allowed formulating a rather simple solution procedure. Like in the classical 
lot-sizing theory generalizations of the model will lead to NP-hard problems, but there is yet a 
hope to find efficient solutions for models with an upper bound of the lot size. 
 
   16 
Tab. 4: Dynamic programming 
m=7, t=  1  2  3  4  5  Fi+Ci-1,t  Ft 
Dt  6  6  6  11  6  -  - 
zt  12  0           
It  6  0        0+6  6 
zt  7  11  0         
It  1  6  0      0+7  7 
zt  7  7  15  0       
It  1  2  11  0    0+14   
zt      7  10       
It      1  0    6+1  7 
zt  7  7  7  14  0     
It  1  2  3  6  0  0+12   
zt      7  16  0     
It      1  6  0  6+7   
zt        17  0     
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